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1954—1955年发生的第一次台湾海峡危机是20世纪50年代中美关系史上的重大事件,也是中美两国继朝鲜战争之后的又一直接较量,使双方再次处于战争的边缘。危机期间,艾森豪威尔政府不断挥舞核成慑这一武器,试图以核威慑来迫使中国做出让步,实现其“两个中国”的意图。但是,美国的强硬政策不仅没有取得任何效果,反而使自己陷入了进退两难的境地。同时,这次危机也表明了中美对抗的限度,揭示了美国“战争边缘政策”和“核威慑”战略的脆弱本质。
The first Taiwan Strait crisis that took place in 1954-1955 was a major event in the history of Sino-U.S. Relations in the 1950s and was another direct contest between the two countries after the Korean War, leaving both sides once again at the verge of a war. During the crisis, the Eisenhower administration kept waving the nuclear deterrent weapon in an attempt to force China to make concessions and realize its “two Chinas” intentions with nuclear deterrence. However, not only has the hardened U.S. policy not achieved any result, it has plunged itself into a dilemma. At the same time, the crisis has also demonstrated the limits of confrontation between China and the United States and revealed the fragile nature of the U.S. “warfront policy” and “nuclear deterrence” strategies.