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本文研究了在供应链采购中的多属性拍卖问题。买家使用逆向拍卖,以确定哪家供应商将被授予供应合同,以及相应的采购价格和采购数量。买方面对不确定的市场需求,而且只知道供应商的生产成本的先验分布。在报童模型的框架下,讨论了基于回购合同的多属性拍卖策略。在回购合同竞拍中,每个供应商的报价包含批发价格和回购价格两个参数,买方的期望效用是这两个参数的函数,并根据宣布的评分规则选择赢家。通过将二维拍卖模型转化为一维拍卖模型,推导出了供应商的均衡竞标策略。研究表明,当评分规则揭示买家的真实效用时,买家能通过供应商的竞标确定生产成本最低的供应商和达到供应链的协调。最后,通过数值分析研究了供应商的数量和生产成本对赢家和买方之间利润分配的影响。
This paper studies the issue of multi-attribute auction in supply chain procurement. Buyers use reverse auctions to determine which supplier will be awarded a supply contract, along with the corresponding purchase price and number of purchases. In the face of uncertain market demand, the buyer knows only the prior distribution of the supplier’s production costs. Under the newsboy model, the multi-attribute auction strategy based on the repo contract is discussed. In a bidding contract, each supplier’s quotation contains two parameters, the wholesale price and the repo price. The buyer’s expected utility is a function of both parameters and the winner is selected according to the declared scoring rules. By transforming the two-dimensional auction model into a one-dimensional auction model, the equilibrium bidding strategy of the supplier is deduced. Research shows that when the scoring rules reveal the true utility of the buyer, the buyer can identify the supplier with the lowest production costs through the bidding of the supplier and achieve the coordination of the supply chain. Finally, numerical analysis is conducted to investigate the effect of the number of suppliers and the cost of production on the profit distribution between the winner and the buyer.