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1950—1975年两次印度支那战争期间,美国中央情报局就中国在印度支那的意图、出兵干预的可能性等问题进行了评估和预测,提出了数十份分析报告,为政府决策提供了情报支持。尽管很难确定这些分析报告究竟对美国政府的决策产生了哪些具体影响,但从中可以看出,中国直接出兵干预的可能性是制约美国扩大印度支那战争的一个关键因素。特别是在第二次印度支那战争时期,美国之所以对轰炸越南北方有所顾忌,最主要的考虑是避免在朝鲜战争之后再次与中国发生大规模的军事冲突。
During the two Indochinese Wars from 1950 to 1975, the CIA evaluated and predicted China’s intention in Indochina and the possibility of military intervention. It submitted dozens of analysis reports and provided intelligence for government decision-making stand by. Although it is difficult to determine exactly what these reports actually have on the U.S. government’s decision-making, it can be seen that the possibility of China’s direct military intervention is a key factor restricting the U.S. expansion of the Indo-China war. Especially in the Second Indochina War, the main reason why the United States scruples the bombing of northern Vietnam is to avoid another large-scale military clash with China after the Korean War.