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法官决策的态度模型一直是司法行为研究的主流模型,但该模型缺乏对制度环境的关注而始终无法解释法官“意识形态漂移”的现象。在新制度主义理论的影响下,策略模型应运而生,成为新兴的理论模型。该模型以理性选择理论为基础,以理性经济人作为人性预设,将法官的决策过程视为法院内部法官之间的策略互动过程以及法院与其他政治机构之间的博弈过程。运用策略模型研究制度约束条件下的法官群体决策行为具有重要价值,但是,该理论模型的解释力仍然具有一定限度。
The attitude model of judges’ decision-making has always been the mainstream model of judicial behavior research. However, this model can not explain the phenomenon of judge “ideological drift ” due to the lack of attention to institutional environment. Under the influence of neo-institutionalism theory, the strategy model came into being and becomes a new theoretical model. The model is based on the theory of rational choice, the rational agent of human nature as the human nature, the judge’s decision-making process as an inter-judicial process of strategic interaction between judges and the court and other political institutions between the game process. It is of great value to study the decision-making behavior of the judge group under the institutional constraints by using the tactic model. However, the explanatory power of the theoretical model still has some limits.