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本文将上市公司大股东关系纳入股东控制权的研究视野,结合社会资本理论,提出积极股权联盟度量控制权配置的思路,并以我国2008至2013年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了积极股权联盟对董事会监督效果的影响。研究发现,由积极股权联盟控制的公司,其董事会监督效果显著更好;第一大股东主导积极股权联盟时,股权集中与股权制衡更易达到平衡点,从而有助于提升董事会监督效果;积极股权联盟中股东数量越多,持股比例越低时,董事会监督效果越好,这主要归因于积极股权联盟实现了社会资本的最优配置。
In this paper, the relationship between major shareholders of listed companies is included in the research field of shareholder control. Based on the theory of social capital, a positive alliance is proposed to measure the allocation of control rights. Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2013, The Influence of Active Stock Ownership on the Supervision of the Board of Directors. The research shows that the company supervised by the active equity alliance has a significantly better supervision effect on the board of directors. When the largest shareholder dominates the active equity alliance, the ownership concentration and balance of stock rights are more likely to reach the equilibrium point, which helps to enhance the supervisory effect of the board of directors. Positive equity The higher the number of shareholders in the coalition and the lower the percentage of shares held, the better the supervision of the board of supervisors is. This is mainly attributed to the optimal allocation of social capital by the active equity alliance.