Militarized Oil——Mercantilism:An Asset or Liability for China’s Energy Security?

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Chinas energy security is becoming of ever greater concern to the government and theCommunist Party, as there is no replacement for oil which is crucial for high growth ratesand raising living standards of the common population to legitimize the rule of the party.Yet, oil not only runs the civilian industry and large parts of the countrys infrastructurebut also the military, providing a strong base for cooperation between both sectors.  The state-ownership of the military-industrial complex and the oil-companies, togetherwith Chinas stance on non-interference and willingness to project its interests abroad,both parties have a strong rationale for cooperation out of structural and interest-basedreasons.This thesis examines the points of connection upon a convergence of interestswithin the greater setting of Chinas national interests and the structure of decision-making in foreign policy making based on network theories and ideas of neo-idealism.Having a rationale, preconditions and structure for a military-energy cooperation established,it is evident that Chinas management of its bilateral ties and protection of interests withinthe current status quo further such cooperation as China is a late-comer on the international energy markets and so has to deal with weak govemments where other oil-majorsdo not invest, and the need for keeping relations on a pragmatic, friendly and mutuallybeneficial level.This requires ever higher investments to satisfy the needs of the governments concerned, which in many cases is about sanctioned or embargoed goods such asarms.However, this materialization of bilateral ties in terms of investment-flux and infrastructure projects in order to alter the structure of the current status quo in Chinas favoris determined by Chinas capacity to deal with externalities further abroad, intensity ofmarket forces and the wider international setting that may, if China doesnt open its protection of interests as global common good, unleash forces harmful to its long-term energy security interests and the geographic scope of their protection as both the internationalmarkets and counterbalancing efforts are sensitive to mercantilistic attempts, so that measures to protect the status quo are likely to backfire on Chinas energy security interests.
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