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本文是对Kiymaz和Taylor(2000)论文的一个扩展。同样是研究当各东道国政府不能确定跨国公司做FDI的固定成本时吸引FDI的竞争,具体考察这种不确定性程度的大小对东道国政府补贴策略及其福利的影响。但是与其结论不同的是,我们发现,当把由技术外溢和东道国间的技术差距导致的不对称性考虑在内时,并非不确定性程度越高,两个东道国的期望福利越大;当不确定性程度已经比较小时,与跨国公司进行信息沟通,进一步降低不确定性会使各东道国的福利都得到改善。
This article is an extension of the paper by Kiymaz and Taylor (2000). The same is the study of host governments when the government can not determine the fixed cost of FDI to attract FDI competition, specifically to examine the extent of this uncertainty on the host country government subsidies and their benefits. But contrary to its conclusion, we find that the expected benefits of both host countries are greater when the degree of uncertainty is not taken into account when the asymmetries resulting from technological spillovers and technology gaps among host countries take into account; When the certainty level has been relatively small, information communication with multinational corporations and further reduction of the uncertainty will improve the welfare of all host countries.