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本文基于2005—2013年A股上市公司以及与此匹配的市委书记更替数据进行实证检验,研究结果显示,地方政府换届会提高税务机关的税收征管力度,企业税收激进程度将会降低,造成这一现象的主要原因有两个:一是政治关联失效与政治晋升激励驱动下新任官员加强税收征管力度,二是企业面对地方政府换届引发的政策、市场和政治风险不确定性时采取谨慎的避税行为。
Based on the empirical study of the A-share listed companies in 2005-2013 and the replacement data of the municipal party secretaries, the results show that the local governments will change the tax authorities’ tax collection and management authority, and tax incentives will be reduced, resulting in this There are two main reasons for the phenomenon: one is that the newly appointed officials under the impetus of political promotion and incentive promotion strengthen tax collection and management; the other is that enterprises take a cautious tax avoidance in face of the policy, market and political risks caused by the change of local government behavior.