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投资者法律保护制度的加强是否抑制了企业盈余管理?本文以中国A股上市公司为样本,基于应计项目和真实活动两种盈余操控模式对这一问题进行了考察。但两种模式却得出了完全迥异的结论,即投资者保护法律制度在降低了应计项目盈余管理的同时,提高了真实活动盈余管理;进一步的研究发现这一结论仅存在于国有企业。本文的发现拓展了对资者法律保护与企业盈余管理的研究,也对投资者保护制度的进一步完善和国有企业的改革有一定的借鉴意义。
Whether the legal protection of investors strengthens the enterprise earnings management is restrained? This paper examines this issue based on the Chinese A-share listed companies, based on the two surplus control modes of accruals and real activities. However, the two models have drawn completely different conclusions. That is, the investor protection legal system has reduced the real-life earnings management while reducing the accrued project earnings management. Further research finds that this conclusion exists only in the state-owned enterprises. The discovery of this article expands the research on the legal protection of corporate investors and the management of corporate earnings, and also provides some reference to the further improvement of the investor protection system and the reform of state-owned enterprises.