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本文探讨非对称信息下,制造商针对议价能力不同的大型及小型零售商分别采用了收益共享、批发价合约时,大型零售商的市场信息被制造商泄露给竞争对手,从而对供应链产生的影响。通过对比有无信息泄露下各方成员的博弈过程,分析供应链信息泄露的原理;进而在制造商总是会泄露信息的前提下,构建基于信号传递的信息泄露下供应链成员决策模型,分别讨论分离均衡与混同均衡两种情形下,零售商的订货策略及其相应的收益。在此基础上进一步做出扩展,制造商有主动权以选择是否泄露信息的情况,对比分析零售商的策略选择问题。经过分析发现,出于自身利益的角度,制造商总是会泄露信息,从而导致供应链的整体利润下滑。对此,大型零售商的订货策略选择与市场需求的波动程度有关:波动较小则选择混同均衡;波动较大则选择分离均衡。特别地,当市场需求为低时,大型零售商的最优订货量会向下扭曲,即支付一定的“信息租金”作为应对信息泄露的代价。
This paper explores asymmetric information, manufacturers for large and small retailers with different bargaining power, respectively, the use of revenue sharing, wholesale contract, the large retailer’s market information was leaked to competitors by the manufacturer, resulting in the supply chain influences. By comparing the game process of the parties with or without information leakage, this paper analyzes the principle of information leakage in supply chain, and then constructs the decision model of supply chain members under information leakage under the premise that manufacturers always disclose information. Discussed the separation of equilibrium and mixed equilibrium two cases, the retailer’s ordering strategy and its corresponding benefits. On this basis, we make further expansion. Manufacturers have the initiative to choose whether to disclose the information, and analyze the retailer’s strategy selection. After analysis, it is found that for the sake of their own interests, manufacturers always leak information, resulting in the overall profit decline in the supply chain. In this regard, large retailers order strategy and market demand fluctuations in the degree of choice: a small fluctuation is the choice of hybrid equilibrium; large fluctuations choose to balance. In particular, when the market demand is low, the optimal order quantity for a large retailer can be distorted downward by paying a certain “rent” for the information leakage.