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中国地方政府公共支出结构对地区经济增长的效应是理论界探讨的热点。运用全国的省级面板数据进行实证研究,结果表明,在中央政治集权—地方经济分权的情况下,公共支出结构的增长效应具有一定的制度特征。现实中地方政府倾向于生产性支出,忽视民生性支出。但是,前者对滞后期的增长效应相对较小,而后者对滞后期增长的效应较为明显。研究进一步发现,地方政府行为的根源在于面对较强的政治激励、经济激励与较小的公众声誉机制约束。
The effect of the structure of public expenditure on local economic growth in China is a hot topic in the theoretical circle. Empirical study using the national provincial panel data shows that the growth effect of the structure of public expenditure has certain institutional characteristics under the central political centralization of power - local economic decentralization. In reality, local governments tend to pay for productive activities while ignoring people’s livelihood expenses. However, the former has a relatively small growth effect on the lag phase, while the latter has a more pronounced effect on the lagged growth. The study further found that the root cause of local government behavior lies in the face of strong political incentives, economic incentives and a smaller public reputation mechanism.