论文部分内容阅读
针对产能过剩背景下企业难以通过提升产量而增加绩效的问题,研究了以提升工人成本控制和质量改进积极性为目的的激励机制。通过建立企业管理者和工人间基于成本和质量双标准的委托代理模型,并分析相关参数分别对工人在两任务中的最优投入水平和最优风险分担水平的影响,发现了由于某项任务的投入过低而可能导致的激励失衡问题,进而给出相应解决方案。研究表明:①在某任务上,工人能力的提升、惰性的降低和风险的降低均可提升该任务的激励强度,并使其投入另一任务的部分努力转移至该任务;②某任务参数的改变对工人在该任务中的风险分担及努力投入的影响幅度大于另一任务;③任务关联性的改变可使工人的努力投入发生转移,且关联性越大,转移程度越大,而系数的增减则决定了转移的方向。
Against the background of overcapacity companies, it is difficult for companies to increase their performance by increasing their output. This paper studies incentive mechanisms that aim to increase workers’ cost control and quality improvement initiatives. Through the establishment of a principal-agent model based on the double standards of cost and quality between enterprise managers and workers, and analyzing the influence of related parameters on the optimal input level and the optimal risk sharing level of workers in the two tasks, it was found that due to a certain task The problem of incentive imbalance caused by too low investment will give a corresponding solution. Research shows that: 1 In a certain task, the improvement of worker’s ability, the reduction of inertia and the reduction of risk can all increase the incentive intensity of the task, and make part of the effort to put it into another task to transfer to the task; 2 Some task parameter The impact of the change on the risk sharing and effort input of workers in this task is greater than that of another task; 3 The change in the relevance of tasks can cause the shift of workers’ effort input, and the greater the correlation, the greater the degree of transfer, and the coefficient of Increases or decreases determine the direction of the transfer.