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近些年来,旅游地之间的竞争与合作一直是旅游研究的热点问题。从博弈论的角度切入,通过建立伯特兰德模型,分析在寡头垄断环境下景区的竞争策略,确定均衡条件下的最优门票价格;通过引入“智猪博弈”模型,以旅游基础设施投资为例,分析了几种不同情况下景区间的合作关系,提出在景区实力较悬殊的情况下,小景区存在通过搭便车增加自身游客量的方法;而在其他几种情况中,景区间可能分摊投资费用或者都不愿投资;最后,通过对阿坝和皖南两个案例的讨论,初步验证了提出的理论观点。
In recent years, the competition and cooperation between tourist destinations has always been a hot issue in tourism research. From the point of view of game theory, through establishing Bertrand model, this paper analyzes the competitive strategy in the scenic area under the oligopoly environment and determines the optimal ticket price under the equilibrium condition. By introducing the model of “Chi Pig” Facilities investment as an example, the paper analyzes the cooperation between scenic spots in several different situations, and proposes that there should be a method for small scenic spots to increase their own tourist volume by free riding when the scenic spot strength is rather poor. In other cases, scenic spots May share the investment costs or are reluctant to invest; Finally, through the discussion of two cases of Aba and Wannan, we preliminarily verify the theoretical points raised.