公司治理结构的最优配置——关于物质资本所有者主权、人力资本所有者主权和利益相关者主权的思考

来源 :天津商学院学报 | 被引量 : 0次 | 上传用户:lixufengz
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介绍了公司治理结构的种种定义 ,并运用新制度经济学的产权理论和企业理论构建了一个关于公司治理结构配置的分析框架 ,力求解释治理结构的种种分布和变化。借助这一分析框架 ,既能推导出治理主体唯一的公司治理结构的两点分布 ,如“资本雇佣劳动”型的古典企业和“劳动占用资本”型的员工主权企业 ,又能逻辑一致地解释人力资本所有者与非人力资本所有者共同拥有企业所有权的均匀分布式企业公司治理结构。最后得出结论认为 ,在现实的治理结构选择中 ,剩余索取权与控制权集中于单一治理主体只是一种特例 ,更普遍存在的则是一种治理权的均匀分布。 This paper introduces various definitions of corporate governance structure and uses the theory of property rights and enterprise theory of New Institutional Economics to construct an analytical framework for the allocation of corporate governance structure and tries to explain the distribution and changes of governance structure. With this analysis framework, we can deduce two distributions of the only corporate governance structure of the main governance body, such as the classic enterprise of “capital wage labor” and the employee sovereign enterprise of “labor capital occupation”, which can be interpreted logically and consistently Homogeneous and distributed corporate governance structure in which the owner of the human capital and the owner of the non-human capital jointly own the ownership of the enterprise. Finally, it is concluded that in the choice of the actual governance structure, the residual claims and control are concentrated on a single governing body is only a special case, more common is a uniform distribution of governance rights.
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