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根据2010年中国家庭追踪调查村庄数据,本文实证研究发现中国农村基层的政治参与影响了村庄治理。从支出看,选民参与使村庄损耗性的行政管理费比例下降,但并未显著提高村庄公共服务和生产投资的比例,村干部为获取民心增加村民分配,并提高集体投资和其他支出以弥补行政管理费下降所造成的损失。从收入看,选民参与降低了村庄对农民的征收使村民缴纳比例下降,但并未显著增加土地房屋出租收入和上级政府收入,村干部转而提高集体经济提留以弥补收支缺口。宗族网络弱化选民参与对村庄治理的作用,而候选人竞争则强化选民参与对村庄治理的影响。因此,选民参与在一定程度上约束了村干部行为,但中国村庄选举具有显著的消费性,欠缺着眼于长远的生产功能。
According to the data from 2010 China Family Tracing Survey, the empirical study shows that the political participation of rural grassroots in China has affected the governance of villages. From the perspective of expenditures, the percentage of villagers participating in making the village feeble administrative expenses decreased, but did not significantly increase the ratio of village public services and production investment. Village cadres increased the villagers’ allocation for the purpose of gaining popular support and increased collective investment and other expenditures to make up for the administrative Loss of management fees caused by the loss. From the perspective of income, the participation of voters in reducing the village’s collection of peasants reduced the proportion of villagers paid, but did not significantly increase the rental income of land houses and the income of the higher level government. The village cadres in turn raised the collective economy to make up for the deficit. Patriarchal networks weaken voters’ participation in village governance, while competition for candidates reinforces the influence of electoral participation on village governance. Therefore, the participation of voters has restricted the behavior of village cadres to a certain extent. However, the election of Chinese villages is obviously consumptive and lacks the long-term production function.