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在专业性很强的医疗服务系统中,委托—代理问题比较严重,这都源于保险机构、医疗消费者、医疗机构与医生之间所产生的复杂的代理关系。由于委托人与代理人目标的不同,不可避免地产生冲突,造成代理成本,导致资源的浪费、医疗成本的上升与医疗质量的下降,这些代理成本最终由患者与企业共同承担。为降低代理问题产生的代理成本,文章提出通过提高患者对医疗成本的敏感度,以控制医疗机构和医生过度提供医疗服务。
In the highly professional medical service system, the principal-agent problem is relatively serious, which stems from the complicated agency relations between insurance institutions, medical consumers, medical institutions and doctors. Due to the differences in the objectives of the principal and the agent, conflicts inevitably arise, resulting in agency costs, waste of resources, rising medical costs, and declining medical quality. These agency costs are ultimately shared by patients and enterprises. In order to reduce agency costs arising from agency problems, the article proposes to control medical institutions and doctors to provide medical services excessively by increasing patient sensitivity to medical costs.