医疗系统的委托—代理问题探讨

来源 :卫生软科学 | 被引量 : 0次 | 上传用户:zhoushucheng0533
下载到本地 , 更方便阅读
声明 : 本文档内容版权归属内容提供方 , 如果您对本文有版权争议 , 可与客服联系进行内容授权或下架
论文部分内容阅读
在专业性很强的医疗服务系统中,委托—代理问题比较严重,这都源于保险机构、医疗消费者、医疗机构与医生之间所产生的复杂的代理关系。由于委托人与代理人目标的不同,不可避免地产生冲突,造成代理成本,导致资源的浪费、医疗成本的上升与医疗质量的下降,这些代理成本最终由患者与企业共同承担。为降低代理问题产生的代理成本,文章提出通过提高患者对医疗成本的敏感度,以控制医疗机构和医生过度提供医疗服务。 In the highly professional medical service system, the principal-agent problem is relatively serious, which stems from the complicated agency relations between insurance institutions, medical consumers, medical institutions and doctors. Due to the differences in the objectives of the principal and the agent, conflicts inevitably arise, resulting in agency costs, waste of resources, rising medical costs, and declining medical quality. These agency costs are ultimately shared by patients and enterprises. In order to reduce agency costs arising from agency problems, the article proposes to control medical institutions and doctors to provide medical services excessively by increasing patient sensitivity to medical costs.
其他文献
目的:了解上海市公共卫生专业机构技术人员的自身定位、职业需求和期望。方法:以分层整群随机抽样相结合的方法抽取上海市36家公共卫生专业机构中的专业技术人员1019人进行相