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中央与地方之间的权力配置改革是促成中国改革开放30年来经济跨越式发展的重要制度性动因。既有文献多侧重于财政分权对经济绩效影响的研究,视角比较单一,而对行政分权与经济增长之相互关系、财政分权与行政分权对经济绩效影响之差异性、财政分权与行政分权二者之间的互补性研究多付之阙如。通过选取1999~2011年中国的省级面板数据,从多个角度对中央与地方权力配置改革问题进行研究,实证结果表明财政分权与行政分权改革均在不同程度上促进了中国经济的增长,但是二者之间的制度互补性没能得到很好地体现。研究结果说明中国目前中央与地方之间财政权与行政权之划分并不匹配,中央政府简政放权工作不尽通彻,诸多核心性经济管理职权仍旧由中央政府主揽,地方政府服务市场的激励动力不足。
The reform of the distribution of power between the central and local governments is an important institutional motivation for promoting the leapfrog economic development in the past 30 years since China’s reform and opening up. The existing literature focuses more on the study of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic performance, with a single perspective. However, the relationship between administrative decentralization and economic growth, the difference in the impact of fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization on economic performance, and fiscal decentralization And administrative decentralization between the two complementary study of the lack of pay. By selecting the provincial panel data from 1999 to 2011 in China, this paper studies the reform of central and local power allocation from many angles. The empirical results show that both the fiscal decentralization and the reform of administrative decentralization have promoted the growth of China’s economy in varying degrees , But the complementarity between the two systems can not be well represented. The results of the study show that the division of fiscal power and administrative power between the central and local governments does not match at present, and that the ease and decentralization of the Central Government by the government is not fully understood. Many core economic management powers are still under the control of the central government and are encouraged by the local government service market Lack of motivation.