现代企业因所有权和经营权的分离 ,企业由众多的股东占有 ,企业经营者不具有剩余索取权 ,在这种情况下不可避免地产生委托—代理关系 ,而且委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称致使股东对经营者的监督难以完全实施。因此 ,需要一套良好的激励机制 ,这涉及监督成本问题 ,而企业对其监督成本的控制受到种种因素的影响。该研究基于博弈理论 ,借用完全信息静态博弈、完全信息动态博弈、不完全信息静态博弈、不完全信息动态博弈等不同类型模型 ,分析发现 ,在完全信息的条件下 ,经营者不道德的最优选择取决于所有人监督的概率 ;在不完全信息的条件下 ,经营者不道德时对所有者采取策略的最佳反应 Because of the separation of ownership and management rights, the modern enterprise is occupied by numerous shareholders. The enterprise operator does not have residual claim rights. In this case, the principal-agent relationship is inevitable, and the information between the principal and the agent Asymmetry makes it difficult for shareholders to supervise the business operators. Therefore, there is a need for a good set of incentive mechanisms, which involves overseeing the cost issue. The control of the company’s supervision costs is affected by various factors. Based on the game theory, the study borrows the complete information static game, complete information dynamic game, incomplete information static game, incomplete information dynamic game and other types of models, and analyzes and finds that, under the condition of complete information, the operator is unethically optimal. The choice depends on the probability of supervision by all; in the case of incomplete information, the operator’s best response to the owner’s strategy when it is immoral