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对比分析Prosper和拍拍贷平台的运行模式、风险控制以及收费模式等方面的差异性,指出中国P2P网络借贷在借款人准入门槛、借贷票据、以及费用收取与信用状况挂钩等方面存在不足.随后在借鉴Prosper运行机制的基础上,提出一种动态逆向拍卖机制,用以研究国内P2P行业借贷问题的运行机制.在此,证明了动态逆向拍卖机制满足激励相容特性,并且存在纳什均衡解;同时从该机制的拍卖策略出发,提出已知拍卖定价情境和未知拍卖定价情境的两种拍卖策略.最后通过算例指出,已知拍卖定价情境的拍卖策略有利于改进贷款人的收益、分散投资风险,可以用于改进目前中国P2P网络借贷的运行模式.
By comparing and analyzing the differences between Prosper and the pat-loan platform in terms of operation mode, risk control and charging mode, it points out that P2P lending in China is deficient in borrowers access threshold, loan notes, and the connection between fee collection and credit status. Then, based on Prosper’s operating mechanism, a dynamic reverse auction mechanism is proposed to study the operation mechanism of domestic P2P industry’s lending problem, where the dynamic reverse auction mechanism is proved to be incentive compatible and Nash equilibrium exists At the same time, two auction strategies of known auction pricing scenarios and unknown auction pricing scenarios are proposed based on the auction strategy of the mechanism.Finally, an example is given to show that the auction strategies of known auction pricing scenarios are helpful to improve the profitability of lenders and decentralize Investment risk can be used to improve the current mode of operation of China’s P2P network lending.