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针对管理层激励对盈余管理行为的影响,根据应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的不同特点,建立管理层与股东之间的盈余管理博弈模型,讨论薪酬激励和管理层持股两种常见激励措施对管理层盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明,无论是否持有本企业股份,管理层均会采取盈余管理行为,未持有本企业股份的管理层更倾向于实施真实盈余管理。固定薪酬不会引发管理层盈余管理行为,而基于盈余的奖励薪酬会增加管理层应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理水平。管理层持股会导致管理层的盈余管理行为发生变化,引起管理层增加应计盈余管理水平,但对真实盈余管理及整体盈余管理水平的影响受真实盈余管理对企业价值破坏程度的制约。
In view of the influence of management incentive on earnings management behavior, according to different characteristics of accrual earnings management and real earnings management, this paper builds a earnings management game model between management and shareholders, and discusses two common incentives: compensation incentive and management shareholding Impact on management’s earnings management behavior. The results of the research show that the management takes the earnings management behavior regardless of whether it holds the shares of the enterprise or not, and the management that does not hold the shares of the company is more inclined to implement the real earnings management. Fixed remuneration does not trigger management’s earnings management, and earnings-based remuneration remuneration increases management’s accrual and real earnings management. The management shareholding will lead to the change of management’s earnings management behavior and cause the management to increase the accrued earnings management level. However, the impact on the real earnings management and the overall earnings management level is restricted by the real earnings management to the destruction of the enterprise value.