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企业之间的纵向并购很大程度上是基于效率原因同,但是在特定的情况下也可能会产生限制竞争的市场封锁效应。企业之间纵向并购的市场封锁效应很大程度上受到序列市场结构的影响。本文分析四种序列市场结构下纵向并购的经济效应,结论显示:在序列寡头市场结构下,纵向并购可能会带来下游零售市场的价格上升,应该受到反垄断机关的重点关注;在其他序列市场结构下,纵向并购本身不会伤害市场竞争,反垄断机关应该重点关注企业滥用行为。据此,提出了基于序列市场结构的纵向并购的四步反垄断执法检验规则,并认为应该采取以行为救济为主的反垄断救济措施。
Vertical mergers and acquisitions between enterprises are largely based on the same reasons for efficiency, but under certain circumstances may also have a market blockade effect that limits competition. The market blockade effect of vertical M & A among enterprises is greatly affected by the sequence market structure. This paper analyzes the economic effects of vertical mergers and acquisitions under the four sequential market structures. The conclusion shows that under the sequential oligarchic market structure, vertical mergers and acquisitions may cause the prices of downstream retail markets to rise, which should be the focus of antitrust authorities. In other sequential markets Structure, the vertical mergers and acquisitions itself will not hurt the market competition, antitrust authorities should focus on corporate abuse. Accordingly, a four-step anti-monopoly law enforcement inspection rule based on sequential market structure is proposed, and the antitrust remedy measures based on behavioral remedies should be taken.