本文以2002—2009年我国上市公司为研究对象,探讨了股权分置改革前后我国企业管理层股权激励对研发投资的影响,并在此基础上检验了管理层股权激励的内生性。研究发现,高管股权激励存在内生性,在控制了内生性之后,股改前股权激励与研发投资之间存在倒U形曲线关系;股改后股权激励对研发投资具有显著的正向影响。本文结果表明应该将研发投资作为股权激励方案的激励条件之一;此外,合理的安排股东与管理层之间的股权配置比例是保证企业有效进行研发投资、提升企业自主创新能力的必要手段。本文的结论深化了我们对股权激励内生性的理解,并为我国企业更好地实施管理层股权激励和企业自主创新战略提供了理论支持和实证证据。 This paper takes the listed companies in China from 2002 to 2009 as the research object, discusses the influence of equity incentives on the R&D investment of the management of Chinese enterprises before and after the equity division reform, and on this basis, tests the endogenousness of management equity incentives. The study found that executive incentives existed endogenously. After controlling endogeneity, there was an inverted U-shape relationship between equity incentives before stock reform and R&D investment; equity incentives after stock reform had a significant positive effect on R&D investment. The results of this paper indicate that R&D investment should be used as one of the incentive conditions for the equity incentive plan; furthermore, a reasonable arrangement of the ratio of shareholdings between shareholders and management is a necessary means to ensure that companies effectively conduct R&D investment and enhance their independent innovation capabilities. The conclusions of this article have deepened our understanding of the endogenous nature of equity incentives and provided theoretical support and empirical evidence for Chinese enterprises to better implement management equity incentives and corporate independent innovation strategies.