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产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派,研究结果均表明,规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率,降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题,并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验,结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应,即规制低效率。因此,规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率,而解决问题的关键是机制设计。
The research on the collusion between companies in the theory of industrial organization is divided into the Chicago School and the Toulouse School. The results show that the collusion between regulatory agencies and the regulated enterprises reduces the efficiency of regulation and reduces the level of social welfare. The article mainly studies the collusion between the local regulatory agencies and the regulated enterprises in the current background of decentralization in China and tests the effectiveness of the regulation by means of measurement. The results show that there is no significant positive effect on the decentralization of the regulation, that is, Regulate inefficiencies. Therefore, the collusion resulting from the decentralization of regulation leads to the inefficiency of regulation. The key to solving the problem is the mechanism design.