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2008年金融危机之后,银行高管薪酬的合理性受到广泛的关注,由于收入效应,薪酬满意度高,高管人员努力程度高,银行效率高;但薪酬同时具有替代效应,过高的薪酬水平可能减少高管人员对工作的付出,导致效率下降,所以薪酬水平具有一个有效激励的区间,超过一定水平之后,会降低银行效率。本文选取了我国23家商业银行2005~2010年6年的数据作为研究样本,研究了高管薪酬水平与我国商业银行效率之间的关联性,探讨了高管薪酬的激励作用。研究发现,高管薪酬与成本效率、纯技术效率和配置效率显著正相关,与规模效率的关系不显著。即高管的薪酬可以作为商业银行成本控制、技术应用、资源配置的一个重要解释因素。
After the financial crisis of 2008, the bank managers pay due attention to the rationality of extensive attention, due to income effects, pay satisfaction, senior management efforts, high bank efficiency; but pay also has a substitution effect, excessive salary levels May reduce the senior management’s contribution to work, resulting in a decrease in efficiency. Therefore, the salary level has an effective incentive range, and above a certain level, bank efficiency will be reduced. This paper chooses the data of 23 commercial banks in China from 2005 to 2010 as the research sample, studies the correlation between the executive compensation level and the efficiency of commercial banks in our country, and explores the incentive effect of executive compensation. The study found that executive compensation is significantly and positively related to cost efficiency, pure technical efficiency and configuration efficiency, but not significant to scale efficiency. That is, executives’ remuneration can be used as an important explanatory factor for commercial bank cost control, technology application and resource allocation.