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罗素在《论指谓》中宣称他的摹状词理论目标之一就是拒斥弗雷格的Sinn(涵义)和Bedeutung(指称)二分,剔除Sinn这一概念,坚持意义即指称的观点。然而,罗素用meaning(意义)来翻译弗雷格的Sinn,并在不同意义上混乱使用meaning一词,如,先说限定摹状词的意义可以从其构成词的意义看出,然后又结论性地说限定摹状词独立没有意义。罗素对meaning一词不审慎的使用,首先是直接导致了在重要论证中存在的一系列自相矛盾或纠缠不清,最根本的是它遮蔽了这样一个事实:罗素摹状词理论无法剔除弗雷格的“涵义”这一概念。厘清这一点,可以修正“罗素维护了意义即指称的看法”这一常见的不准确说法,从而更清楚地、更客观地认识罗素这一哲学典范之作的真正意义。
One of Russell’s claims to his theory of descriptive words in The Theory of Testimonials is to reject Freunds Sinn (meaning) and Bedeutung (alias) in dichotomy, excluding the Sinn concept, insisting on the meaning of the allegation. However, Russell translates Frege’s Sinn with meaning (meaning), and confuses the meaning word in different senses, for example, by first defining the meaning of a definite description from the meaning of its constituent words and then concluding Sexually speaking, it does not make sense to limit the description of a description. Russell’s cautious use of the word “meaning”, above all, leads directly to a series of contradictions or tangles in the important argument. The most fundamental one is that it obscures the fact that the theory of Russell’s description can not exclude Craig’s “meaning” of this concept. To clarify this point, one can correct the common inaccuracy of “Russell maintains the meaning, namely the alleged opinion,” so as to more clearly and objectively understand the true meaning of Russell’s philosophical paradigm.