本文介绍了完全信息下的税收监管博弈模型,文章从局中人的类型,最优策略选择入手进行分析,得出在双方都足够理想的情况下,虽然不可能达到纳什均衡,但是我们还是有可能得到最优解,这个最优解就是最大化局中人效用的行动的概率,也就是混合策略纳什均衡,任何偏离最优解的预测都会被理性纠正。 This paper introduces the tax regulation game model under the complete information. The article analyzes the types of people in the bureau and the choice of the optimal strategy. It is concluded that although both sides are sufficiently ideal, it is impossible to achieve Nash equilibrium, but we still have It is possible to get the optimal solution, which is the probability of maximizing the utility of the human game, that is, the hybrid strategy of Nash equilibrium, and any deviation from the optimal solution will be rationally corrected.