论文首先考察了产权性质对上市公司真实盈余管理活动的影响,发现国有企业的真实盈余管理活动显著高于民营企业。在此基础上,论文基于产权视角考察了公司治理与真实盈余管理活动的关系,发现产权性质显著影响了公司治理对真实盈余管理活动的抑制效果。具体而言,国有上市公司的董事会规模和公司治理综合水平能够显著地降低真实盈余管理,但作为外部公司治理机制之一的独立审计不能有效地抑制国有企业管理者的真实盈余管理活动;民营上市公司的董事会规模和公司治理综合水平对真实盈余管理的影响不显著,但是外部独立审计和董事会独立性能够显著地抑制管理层的真实盈余管理行为。本文的研究表明,产权性质不仅对公司真实盈余管理行为具有重要影响,而且也显著地影响了公司治理机制对真实盈余管理的限制作用。 Firstly, the dissertation examines the impact of property rights on the real earnings management activities of listed companies and finds that the state-owned enterprises’ real earnings management activities are significantly higher than those of private enterprises. On this basis, the paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and real earnings management activities based on the perspective of property rights, and finds that the nature of property rights significantly affects the effectiveness of corporate governance in inhibiting real earnings management activities. Specifically, the scale of the board of directors of listed state-owned companies and the overall level of corporate governance can significantly reduce real earnings management. However, independent auditing, which is one of the external corporate governance mechanisms, cannot effectively curb the real earnings management activities of state-owned enterprise managers. The scale of the company’s board of directors and the overall level of corporate governance have no significant effect on real earnings management, but external independent audit and board independence can significantly inhibit management’s real earnings management behavior. The research in this paper shows that the nature of property rights not only has an important impact on the company’s real earnings management behavior, but also significantly affects the corporate governance mechanism’s limiting effect on real earnings management.