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本文基于双边随机前沿思想构建了高管薪酬租金攫取测度模型,并利用2008—2013年我国民营上市公司高管的微观个体数据,实证检验了当前我国民营上市公司高管薪酬租金攫取的存在性问题,并对租金攫取的真实程度和演变趋势进行了有效测度。研究发现,由权力配置和信息优势等决定的议价能力因素对于实际的高管薪酬存在重要影响,高管拥有的较高议价能力使其在薪酬谈判中处于强势地位;超过九成的高管都获得了高于“公允”价格的薪酬租金,平均而言,高管凭借较强的议价能力攫取了高出“公允”薪酬价格11.04%的租金。当然,具有异质性个体特征以及处于不同薪酬分位上的高管攫取的租金程度不尽相同。尽管近年来针对上市公司治理结构以及薪酬制度市场化改革在不断推进,但样本期内我国民营上市公司高管薪酬的租金攫取现象并未能够得到有效抑制,这是值得警惕的事实。
Based on the double stochastic frontier idea, this paper constructs a model of senior executives’ compensation rent reckoning, and uses the micro individual data of executives of Chinese private listed companies from 2008 to 2013 to test the existence of the executive pay rents in China’s private listed companies empirically , And conducted an effective measure of the real extent and evolution trend of rents. The study found that bargaining power factors determined by the power allocation and information superiority have a significant impact on the actual executive compensation, and the higher bargaining power of senior executives makes them strong positions in the salary negotiation. Over 90% of the executives have On average, senior management relied on strong bargaining power for a rent of 11.04% above “fair ” compensation. Of course, individuals with heterogeneity and senior executives at different pay points may not be able to capture the same level of rents. Although the governance structure of listed companies and the marketization reform of salary system have been advancing in recent years, it is worth to be noticed that the rent reimbursement of senior executives in private listed companies in our country during the sample period has not been effectively suppressed.