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按服务项目支付和按总额预算支付是两种主要的医疗费用支付方式。根据医院的总成本曲线和两种支付方式下的总收益曲线,可以求出医院两种支付方式下的纯收益曲线。医院根据纯收益最大化原则选择医疗服务数量。由于医保和医院的博弈是医保选择行动在先的动态博弈,博弈的纳什均衡不是资源配置的帕累托最优状态。医疗服务数量不是过度便是过少。把博弈改为静态混合策略博弈,则医保以一定的概率分布选择混合策略,总能实现资源配置的帕累托均衡解。
Pay by service and pay by total budget are two major ways to pay for medical bills. According to the total cost curve of the hospital and the total revenue curve under the two payment methods, the net income curve under the two payment methods of the hospital can be obtained. The hospital selects the number of medical services based on the principle of maximizing net income. Because the game between Medicare and hospital is the first dynamic game of medical insurance choice action, the Nash equilibrium of game is not Pareto optimal of resource allocation. If the number of medical services is not excessive, it is too little. The game is changed to a static mixed strategy game, Medicare choose a mixed strategy with a certain probability distribution, and can always achieve the Pareto equilibrium solution of resource allocation.