本文对国内上市公司经理人的薪酬激励机制进行了调查,并结合其治理结构,研究了税收薪酬激励是否导致了更低的实际所得税率(ETR)。采用Heckman(1976,1990)的两步法估计了Probit模型。结果显示上市公司CEO的税收薪酬激励并没有与实际所得税率(ETR)降低相联系,而具有分支机构的部门经理人,其税收筹划努力与激励相关。经理人的税收筹划努力可能与企业其他特征相联系,从而间接地体现出其税收筹划努力程度。 This paper investigates the compensation incentive mechanism of managers of domestic listed companies and combines their governance structure to study whether tax incentives lead to a lower actual income tax rate (ETR). The Probit model was estimated using the two-step method of Heckman (1976, 1990). The results show that the tax incentives of listed companies’ CEOs have not been linked to the reduction of the actual income tax rate (ETR), and that department managers with branch offices are concerned with tax planning efforts and incentives. The tax planning efforts of managers may be linked to other characteristics of the company, which indirectly reflects its tax planning efforts.