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本文假设合谋竞标者在拍卖之前采用第二价格预拍的合谋机制,求解了第一价格拍卖下的合谋均衡。我们不但考虑了拍卖方对于合谋的最优策略性响应,而且考虑了参与合谋的竞标者与没有参与合谋的竞标者之间的策略性响应,研究表明没有参与合谋的竞标者为了抵消合谋竞标者对于自己的不利影响,在竞价时考虑到合谋的存在会比不存在合谋条件下的竞价更具有进取性,而且拍卖方合理的设定保留价格对于合谋的难易有重要影响。
This paper assumes that conspiracy bidders use the collusion mechanism of the second price pre-auction before the auction to solve the collusion equilibrium under the first price auction. We consider not only the auctioneer’s optimal strategic response to the collusion but also the strategic response between the bidder who participated in the collusion and the bidder who did not participate in the collusion. The study shows that in order to offset the bidding of the colluding bidders, For their own adverse effects, taking into account the existence of collusion in the auction will be more aggressive than the auction without the collusion, and the auctioneer reasonable set reserve price has a significant impact on the difficulty of collusion.