论文部分内容阅读
在《类推与“事物本质”》等学术著作中,考夫曼提出了类型学说。这一学说的贡献在于提出了类型思维这一新的法律适用思路。然而,类型学说也存在理论误区,这主要表现在:它忽视了立法过程中规范类型建构的主体性与司法过程中规范类型确认的语言习惯性。这一理论误区导致考夫曼所提出的类型思维由于无视立法意图与语言习惯的约束而无法成为妥当的法律适用思路。类型学说之所以会陷入这一理论误区,根源于对哲学诠释学的误用。考夫曼从哲学诠释学的视角谈论法律现实化过程立法与司法在结构上的一致性,而事实上,哲学诠释学并不能为这一观点背书。类型学说的失败给我们的启示是:类型思维如果要成为一种真正有用的法律适用思路,必须做到:(1)摆脱哲学诠释学的泥潭;(2)重视语言惯例与立法意图的约束。
In academic works such as “the Nature and Nature of Analogies and Inclusions”, Kaufman proposed the typology. The contribution of this doctrine lies in proposing a new idea of the type of law that is applicable to law. However, typological theory also has theoretical misunderstandings, which are mainly manifested in that it ignores the subjectivity of the normative type construction in the legislative process and the language habit of the normative type confirmation in the judicial process. This theoretical misunderstanding led Kaufmann’s type thinking to ignore the restriction of legislative intention and language habit, and could not be an appropriate legal applicable thought. The reason why typology falls into this theoretical misunderstanding stems from the misuse of philosophical hermeneutics. From the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, Kaufman discusses the structural consistency between legislation and judicature in the process of legal reality. In fact, philosophical hermeneutics can not endorse this view. The implication of typological doctrine to us is that if the type thinking is to become a truly useful law applicable law, we must do the following: (1) to get rid of the confusion of philosophical hermeneutics; (2) to emphasize the constraints of linguistic conventions and legislative intents.