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本文研究经理人隐藏行动、努力成本和风险厌恶态度对经理人激励的影响。本文的研究基于标准委托人-代理人模型,但放松其关于经理人行动不能影响企业风险的假定,而采用更接近现实的假定——企业风险至少部分内生于经理人的行动。通过研究,本文将经理人激励明确细分类为努力增进激励(βeffort激励)和追求风险激励(βrisk激励)两类。为实现βeffort激励,经理人报酬只需是企业业绩的线性函数即可;但为实现βrisk激励,经理人报酬应是企业业绩的凸函数。
This article examines the impact of manager hiding, effort costs, and risk aversion on executive incentives. The research in this paper is based on a standard principal-agent model, but relaxes its assumption that manager actions can not affect firm risk, and adopts a more realistic assumption that firm risk is at least partially endogenous to managers’ actions. Through the research, this article explicitly classifies managers’ incentives into two types: efforts to improve the incentives (βeffort incentives) and the pursuit of risk incentives (βrisk incentives). To achieve βeffort motivation, managers’ remuneration can only be a linear function of business performance. However, to realize βrisk motivation, manager compensation should be a convex function of business performance.