本文使用城市数据检验了内生制度与中国经济增长的关系。为了增加财政收入和获得政绩以提高晋升概率,地方官员有激励为非国有投资提供非正式产权保护;改革开放初期集体工业比重影响了地方官员对非国有产权保护的态度,可以视为今天制度的工具变量。IV结果表明:在控制国有化、出海运输成本、产业结构、政策等变量后,物权保护水平不同可以稳健地解释中国城市间大部分经济绩效差距。 This paper uses urban data to examine the relationship between endogenous systems and China’s economic growth. In order to increase fiscal revenue and obtain political performance to improve the probability of promotion, local officials have incentives to provide non-state-owned investment with non-formal property rights protection. During the reform and opening up, the share of collective industry affected local officials’ attitudes toward the protection of non-state-owned property rights. Tool variables. The results of IV show that after controlling for the nationalization, sea transportation costs, industrial structure and policy variables, the different levels of real rights protection can explain most of the economic performance gaps between cities in China.