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本文选取2008—2013年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,从股东与CEO之间的代理冲突出发,考虑我国特殊的制度背景,区分不同产权属性,实证检验了CEO薪酬激励对企业过度投资的治理效应。实证结果表明:CEO未来货币薪酬和CEO货币薪酬对上市公司的过度投资行为具有抑制作用,但国有性质弱化了CEO货币薪酬激励的治理效应;CEO持股对抑制上市公司过度投资不具有显著性。本文研究结果对于理解我国上市公司CEO激励的有效性,提供了重要启示。
This paper chooses the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2013 as the research samples. Starting from the conflict between the shareholders and the CEO, considering the special institutional background of our country and distinguishing different property rights, this paper empirically tests the CEO’s investment in over-investment Governance effect. The empirical results show that: CEO’s future monetary remuneration and CEO’s monetary compensation have an inhibitory effect on overinvestment behavior of listed companies, but the state-owned nature weakens the governance effect of CEO’s monetary compensation incentive; CEO ownership is not significant to inhibit overinvestment of listed companies. The results of this paper provide important implications for understanding the effectiveness of CEO incentives for listed companies in China.