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本文构建了一个包含财政分权、地方政府竞争和劳动收入占比的三维综合分析框架,探讨了财政分权治理结构下地方政府竞争行为对劳动收入占比的影响机制和传导途径,并认为该影响机制主要是通过地方政府的赶超行为、支出规模偏好、资本选择性偏向等因素表现出来的,此类因素造成了劳动收入占比的持续下降。在此基础上,文中构建了相应的计量模型,并基于省级面板数据,运用GMM方法考察和检验了财政分权激励下地方政府竞争行为对劳动收入占比下降的影响效应。最后,根据实证分析的结论提出了相应的政策建议。
This paper constructs a three-dimensional comprehensive analysis framework including the fiscal decentralization, local government competition and labor income proportion, and explores the impact mechanism and transmission path of the local government’s competitive behavior on the proportion of labor income under the fiscal decentralization governance structure. The impact mechanism is mainly manifested by factors such as the surpassing behavior of local governments, the expenditure scale preference and the capital selective bias, which causes the continuous decline in the proportion of labor income. On this basis, a corresponding econometric model is constructed and based on the provincial panel data, GMM is used to examine and test the effect of local governments’ competitive behavior on the declining proportion of labor income under the fiscal decentralization incentive. Finally, according to the conclusion of empirical analysis, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward.