基于区域低碳发展评估构想,建立成本补贴制度下的政企互动动态微分博弈模型,探求激发地方政府与企业热情的符合中国国情低碳发展机制。模型求解表明:地方政府为企业提供一定成本补贴的政企低碳合作制度有助于地区低碳经济发展,对应的Stackelberg主从博弈均衡优于双方单独开展低碳工作的Nash非合作博弈;在相同的地方政府低碳努力轨迹下,政企合作能够推动企业更大程度地投入低碳经营,区域低碳效益得到显著提升。 Based on the concept of regional low-carbon development assessment, a dynamic differential game model of government-enterprise interaction under the cost-subsidy system was established to explore ways to stimulate the enthusiasm of local governments and enterprises in line with China’s low-carbon development mechanism. The solution of the model shows that the low-carbon cooperation between government and enterprises, which is subsidized by local governments at a certain cost, contributes to the development of low-carbon economy in the region. The corresponding Stackelberg game equilibrium is superior to Nash non-cooperative game in which both parties conduct low-carbon work independently. Under the same low-carbon endeavor of local governments, the cooperation between government and enterprises can promote enterprises to invest more in low-carbon management, and the regional low-carbon benefits have been significantly improved.